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A RESPONSE TO STRAS & SCOTT'S ARE SENIOR
JUDGES UNCONSTITUTIONAL?
Honorable Betty Binns Fletchert
I have been asked to respond to David Stras and Ryan Scott's arti-
cle, Are Senior Judges Unconstitutional?' I do so on a policy level, com-
menting on whether the statute authorizing senior-judge status is a
wise piece of legislation with somewhat scanty attention to the techni-
cal, legalistic arguments of the authors.
I also take this opportunity, which I welcome, to straighten out
the apparently widely accepted misconceptions about the operation of
the antinepotism statute extant at the time of my son William A.
Fletcher's appointment to my court, the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals.
POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
Stras and Scott's article focuses on the constitutional problems
they see in the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 371:2 How can it be that a
senior judge "may retain the office, but retire from regular active ser-
vice" (in other words, not be required to perform the duties that ac-
tive judges are required to perform)? 3
Indeed a dilemma. If the judge has "retain [ed] the office" and
has life tenure, how can he or she be subject to the beck and call of
the circuit's chiefjudge, the circuit council, or the ChiefJustice of the
United States? Senior judges by the statute must be designated and
assigned before performing judicial duties. 4 Refusal to designate
strips a judge of the power to decide cases-the equivalent of removal
t Senior Circuit Judge for the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. I thank the Cornell
Law Review for inviting me to respond to Stras and Scott's interesting and provocative
article.
I David R. Stras & Ryan W. Scott, Are Senior Judges Unconstitutional?, 92 CORNELL L.
REv. 453 (2007).
2 See id. at 456. 28 U.S.C. § 371 in pertinent part reads as follows: "Any justice or
judge of the United States appointed to hold office during good behavior may retire from
the office after attaining the age and meeting the service requirements, whether continu-
ous or otherwise, of subsection (c) and shall, during the remainder of his lifetime, receive
an annuity equal to the salary he was receiving at the time he retired." 28 U.S.C. § 371 (a)
(2000). Various tests for eligibility follow, specifying qualifying activities and quantity of
work. See id. In addition, certification of disability qualifies a judge for continued full pay
including postretirement increases. See id.
3 See Stras & Scott, supra note 1. A senior judge who "retains" the office has essen-
tially relinquished it so that a replacement may be appointed.
4 See 28 U.S.C. § 294.
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from the "retained" office-a result that Article III of the Constitution
allows only through the impeachment process.
What about the constraints of the Appointments Clause?5 Are
the duties of senior judges fundamentally different from those they
were appointed to perform? According to Stras and Scott, Congress
has ignored those constraints, seizing power that unlawfully usurps
the appointment power that the Constitution reserves to the
President.
There we have in fine the authors' premises. Do I agree with
their theses and their "solutions"? Let's see, where do I begin? I shall
start by objecting to being labeled "unconstitutional." Statutes can be
"unconstitutional" and people have "constitutions." But I thought
only actions or statutes could be "unconstitutional." The acts I per-
form as a senior judge may be unconstitutional if the authors' prem-
ises are correct. If they are right, an unconstitutional statute may have
created my status. But I protest: I, myself, am not "unconstitutional."
Stras and Scott's article piques considerable interest in me and I
admire the authors' imaginations-posing what I see as imaginary
problems and nonsolutions to the problems they have created.
The statute creating the status of "senior judge" is an ingenious
one-an elegant response to a real problem. Article III judges are
appointed for life and good behavior. 6 But judges, like all other
human beings, become tired, infirm, less productive, and progress
through life on different biological timetables. Without such status,
many judges would remain in office "in active status" for life, perhaps
eventually becoming senile or completely infirm, depriving the court
system and the public of the ability to appoint replacements. Without
such status, the courts also would be deprived of valuable service and
assistance from those willing and able to continue to perform substan-
tial judicial service but unwilling to commit indefinitely to full-time
service.
The need to protect the courts and the public from the particu-
lar, rare judge who does not recognize his or her loss of capacity to
think and act clearly or rationally is apparent. "Willing and able," I
submit, are precise and objective terms. Far from putting a judge at
the mercy of a vindictive, venal, or politically motivated chief, these
terms set an objective standard. Any possible abuse is the hesitancy of
a chief to deny designation or certification where such action is war-
ranted, rather than to overuse the power.
Do I have any reservations about the wisdom or the constitution-
ality of the statute? Yes, I have one. The statute denies salary in-
5 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
6 See 28 U.S.C. § 371 (b) (1).
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creases other than annual cost of living adjustments (COLAs) to
senior judges who are able but not actively performing services to the
courts. 7 Historically, salary increases for judges have been rare, ob-
tained with great difficulty and only when Congress rewards itself.8
COLAs have not been granted in many years, and studies have estab-
lished that judicial salaries have not kept pace with inflation. 9 Not
only is it unsound and unfair as a matter of policy to deny some senior
judges salary increases, but it may also be a violation of Article III's
provision thatjudges "shall, at stated times, receive for their services, a
compensation, which shall not be diminished during their continu-
ance in office."'10
Justice Owen Roberts, speaking for the Supreme Court in Booth v.
United States, held that a retired judge (as contrasted to a resigned
judge) retained his office as ajudge and that denying him increases in
pay granted subsequent to his retirement constituted a diminution in
pay that violated the Constitution."I Although the statute has been
amended to allow COLAs to all senior judges, other pay raises are
denied unless a senior judge has been certified in each calendar year
as having "carried in the preceding calendar year a caseload involving
courtroom participation which is equal to or greater than the amount
of work involving courtroom participation which an average judge in
active service would perform in three months."'12 Administrative ser-
vice in lieu of court work can also suffice.13 Certification of disability
to perform any services also qualifies a seniorjudge for full pay includ-
ing pay increases postretirement.' 4 I suggest that a challenge to this
provision in an appropriate case might succeed.
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE STATUTE
The authors make ingenious arguments based on questions
raised by Article III's limitation on the sole means for removing judges
(i.e., impeachment) and the Article II Appointments Clause.
7 See id. § 371(b)(2) (cross-referencing id. § 461 for judges who resign).
8 See id. §§ 5, 44, 135; PAUL A. VOLCKER, NAT'L COMM'N ON PUB. SERV., URGENT BusI-
NESS FOR AMERICA: REVITALIZING THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT FOR THE 21sT CENTURY 22-23
(2003), http://www.brookings.edu/gs/cps/voicker/reportfinal.pdf.
9 See, e.g., DAVID M. WALKER, U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, TESTIMONY BEFORE
THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE FEDERAL WORKFORCE AND AGENCY ORGANIZATION, COMMITTEE
ON GOVERNMENT REFORM, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, HUMAN CAPITAL: TRENDS IN Ex-
ECUTIVE COMPENSATION AND JUDICIAL PAY SUGGEST A REEXAMINATION OF THE TOTAL COM-
PENSATION PACKAGE 2 (2006), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d061116t.pdf.
10 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
I I See 291 U.S. 339, 352 (1934).
12 28 U.S.C. § 371(e)(1)(A).
13 See id. §371(e)(1)(B).
14 See id. § 371 (e)(1)(A).
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As interesting as these arguments are, I take comfort in Justice
John Paul Stevens's opinion for the Court in Nguyen v. United States,
wherein he stated, "The panel convened to hear their appeals in-
cluded the Chief Judge and a Senior Circuit Judge of the Ninth Cir-
cuit, both of whom are, of course, life-tenured Article III judges who
serve during 'good behavior' for compensation that may not be di-
minished while in office." 15
THE ANTINEPOTISM STATUTE
Stras and Scott's assertion that my son William A. Fletcher's ap-
pointment to my court, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, violated
the antinepotism statute if I retained my status as ajudge of that court
causes me to respond to the charge.
Section 458 of Title 28, the antinepotism statute, provided as fol-
lows at the time of my son's nomination and appointment: "No per-
son shall be appointed or employed in any court who is related by
affinity or consanguinity within the degree of first cousin to any justice
orjudge of such court. ' 16 My examination of practice, precedent, the
Constitution, and the statute itself leads me to conclude that the stat-
ute did not apply to appointments made by the President of the
United States that are subject to confirmation by the Senate.
First, practice was to the contrary. Learned Hand and his first
cousin, Augustus Hand, served together on the U.S. District Court for
the Southern District of New York. The Arnold brothers, Richard and
Morris, served on the Eighth Circuit. Judge William Matthew Byrne,
Sr. and Judge William Matthew Byrne, Jr., his son, served on the U.S.
District Court for the Central District of California. Other examples
of which I am unaware may exist.
Second, constraining the President's appointment power raises
serious constitutional concerns. Any such interpretation to limit the
class of persons whom the President may appoint certainly raises seri-
ous constitutional concerns as well as issues of sound policy.1 7 Atten-
tion to the constitutional principle of separation of powers cautions
15 539 U.S. 69, 72 (2003) (citing U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 1); see also Booth, 291 U.S. at
350 (noting that retired federal judges as contrasted to resigned judges continue to hold
the office of judge and may continue to perform services as a judge).
16 28 U.S.C. § 458.
17 The Appointments Clause provides:
[The President] shall nominate, and by and with the advice and consent of
the Senate, shall appoint ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls,
judges of the Supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States,
whose appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall
be established by Law; but the Congress may by law vest the appointment of
such inferior officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the
courts of law, or in the heads of departments.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
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against allowing Congress to limit the President's power of appoint-
ment, particularly without explicit reference and acknowledgment in
the statute that it limits the President's authority.
Third, the purpose of antinepotism statutes is to constrain favorit-
ism that otherwise would allow relatives to appoint close relatives thus
leading to appointments for reasons other than merit or qualifying
experience. But no such considerations apply to a process of nomina-
tion by the President and confirmation by the Senate. Indeed, the
appointments of related persons to the Judiciary and, indeed, the
same court is proof. Historically, the antinepotism statute has been
aimed at judges' appointments of court clerks, deputies, and other
employees of the courts related to judges, but never at the appoint-
ment of judges themselves.
Pronouncements of the Attorney General and the Office of Legal
Counsel within the Attorney General's office have uniformly opined
that 28 U.S.C. § 458 does not apply to presidential nominations.' 8 I
make my point best by simply quoting portions of the memorandum:
Two bedrock principles of statutory construction guide our
analysis. First, "we start, as we must, with the language of the stat-
ute." Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 144 (1995). Second, "the
meaning of statutory language, plain or not, depends on context."
Id. at 145. In this case, the particularly relevant constituents of con-
text upon which statutory meaning depends are the constitutional
framework within which all statutes are drafted and enacted, see, e.g.,
Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460 (1991) (stating principle that
statutes be read to protect "the usual constitutional balance" of
power), the statutory language taken as a whole, see, e.g., King v. St.
Vincent's Hosp., 502 U.S. 215, 221 (1991) (stating the "cardinal rule"
that a "statute is to be read as a whole"), and the amendment history
of the statute, see, e.g., Bailey, 516 U.S. at 144 (taking account of
amendment history of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) to determine the
meaning of the word "use"). Based on our review, we conclude that
the plain meaning of the statute precludes its application to presi-
dential appointments to the federal judiciary.
We begin, as indicated, with the language of the statute. The
current language of § 458 was adopted in 1911, amending a statute
originally enacted in 1887. Quoting the language again, § 458 in its
current form provides that: "No person shall be appointed to or
employed in any office or duty in any court who is related by affinity
or consanguinity within the degree of first cousin to any justice or
judge of such court." The statute does not by its express terms ap-
ply to the President, nor does it expressly name judgeships as one of
the offices to which a related person may not be appointed. We
18 See Application of 28 U.S.C. § 458 to Presidential Appointments of Federal Judges,
19 Op. Off. Legal Counsel (1995) (Walter Dellinger).
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believe that the inapplicability of this provision to presidential ap-
pointments of federal judges is conclusively established by the text
of this provision, the history of its amendment, and the text of the
Act of 1911 taken as a whole. We elaborate on these reasons in
Parts II and III of this memorandum, which to a considerable de-
gree recapitulate the analysis contained in our earlier memoran-
dum. Before revisiting these points, however, in this part we analyze
a feature of the constitutional framework within which statutes must
be read that, in our view, also dictates the conclusion that § 458
does not apply to presidential appointments of federal judges, even
if the text and its textual history did not conclusively establish the
point.
Any argument that § 458 does apply to presidential appoint-
ments of federal judges depends entirely upon the fact that, while
the statute refers to positions to which related persons may not be
appointed, it makes no mention at all of the appointing authority,
worded as it is in the passive voice. In this context, however, this
silence must lead to just the opposite conclusion, because of the
well-settled principle that statutes that do not expressly apply to the
President must be construed as not applying to the President if such
application would involve a possible conflict with the President's
constitutional prerogatives. See, e.g., Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505
U.S. 788, 801 (1992). We can refer to this principle as a clear state-
ment rule, one that is very well-established and that dictates the
plain meaning of § 458.
Then-Assistant Attorney General William H. Rehnquist articu-
lated this principle without limiting it to cases in which application
of the statute would raise a constitutional question, opining that
statutes "are construed not to include the President unless there is a
specific indication that Congress intended to cover the Chief Execu-
tive." Memorandum for Egil Krogh, Staff Assistant to the Counsel
to the President, from William H. Rehnquist, Assistant Attorney
General, Office of Legal Counsel, Re: Closing of Government Offices in
Memory of Former President Eisenhower at 3 (Apr. 1, 1969) ("Rehnquist
Memorandum"). Even if this unqualified statement of the principle
is overly broad, the narrower formulation given above clearly covers
§ 458, because its application to presidential appointments to the
federal judiciary would raise serious constitutional questions regard-
ing the President's authority under the Appointments Clause, U.S.
Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2, as we explain below. Therefore, under the
precedents of the Supreme Court as well as of the Department of
Justice, § 458 may not be read as applying to presidential
appointments.
The principle that general statutes must be read as not apply-
ing to the President if they do not expressly apply where application
would arguably limit the President's constitutional role has two
sources. First, it is a long-recognized "cardinal principle" of statu-
tory interpretation that statutes be construed to avoid raising seri-
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ous constitutional questions. See, e.g., Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22
(1932). This canon of statutory construction is a cornerstone of ju-
dicial restraint in that it "not only reflects the prudential concern
that constitutional issues not be needlessly confronted, but also rec-
ognizes that Congress, like this Court, is bound by and swears an
oath to uphold the Constitution." EdwardJ DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida
Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988).
The canon is equally applicable to executive branch interpretations.
Appropriations Limitation for Rules Vetoed by Congress, 4B Op. O.L.C.
731, 732 n.3 (1980).
The second source is the constitutional principle of separation
of powers. The fundamental device by which the framers sought to
prevent tyranny was the division of power to prevent an excessive
accumulation in any single repository. Thus, the Constitution di-
vides power between the federal and the state governments as well
as among the federal government's three coordinate and indepen-
dent branches. See Gregory, 501 U.S. at 458. The clear statement
rule exists in order to protect "th [is] 'usual constitutional balance"'
of power. See id. at 460 (quoting Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police,
491 U.S. 58, 65 (1989) (quoting Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473
U.S. 234, 242 (1985))), Franklin, 505 U.S. at 801 ("requir[ing] an
express statement by Congress before assuming it intended" to sub-
ject presidential action to judicial review); id. ("As the APA does not
expressly allow review of the President's actions, we must presume
that his actions are not subject to its requirements."). Given the
central position that the doctrines of federalism and separation of
powers occupy in the Constitution's design, this rule also serves to
"assure[ ] that the legislature has in fact faced, and intended to
bring into issue, the critical matters" of the balance of power among
the three branches of the federal government, in the context of sep-
aration of powers, and between the federal and state governments,
in the context of federalism. See Gregory, 501 U.S. at 461; United
States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 349 (1971).
This clear statement rule has been applied frequently by the
Supreme Court as well as the executive branch with respect to stat-
utes that might otherwise be susceptible of an application that
would affect the President's constitutional prerogatives, were one to
ignore the constitutional context. For instance, in Franklin the
Court was called upon to determine whether the Administrative
Procedure Act ("APA"), 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706, authorized "abuse of
discretion" review of final actions by the President. The APA autho-
rizes review of final actions by "agencies," which it defines as "each
authority of the Government of the United States." 5 U.S.C.
§ 701(b) (1). From this definition, the APA expressly exempts Con-
gress, the courts, the territories, and the District of Columbia gov-
ernment-but not the President.
2007]
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Even though the statute defined agency in a way that could in-
clude the President and did not list the President among the ex-
press exceptions to the APA, Justice O'Connor wrote for the Court:
[t] he President is not [expressly] excluded from the APA's pur-
view, but he is not explicitly included, either. Out of respect
for the separation of powers and the unique constitutional po-
sition of the President, we find that textual silence is not
enough to subject the President to the provisions of the APA.
We would require an express statement by Congress before as-
suming it intended the President's performance of his statutory
duties to be reviewed for abuse of discretion.
Congressional attempts to limit the class of persons from whom
the President may appoint the highest officers of the government,
including judges, raise serious constitutional concerns. The Ap-
pointments Clause provides that the President
shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the
Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other Public Ministers and
Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of
the United States . . . but the Congress may by Law vest the
Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in
the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of
Departments.
U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. Because the Constitution gives the
President alone the power to nominate non-inferior officers of the
United States, any attempt by Congress to restrict his choice of nom-
inees, otherwise than by the Senate's refusing its consent to a nomi-
nation, is questionable under the Constitution.19
The memorandum goes on to develop fully the legislative history
of the statute and elaborates the need to protect the constitutional
separation of powers, but I think the portions I quote adequately
make the point.
The antinepotism statute extant when my son was appointed did
not and could not apply to the President's nomination of judges and
confirmation by the Senate. Its subsequent amendment after my son's
confirmation makes this fact even clearer. Recognizing that the stat-
ute did not restrict the class of persons whom the President could
nominate, Congress amended the statute to do just that. Indeed, the
statute now purports expressly to eliminate a class of persons from
those among whom the President may appoint.2 0
The legislative history of the statute's amendment is interesting.
As a condition of my son's nomination moving forward in the Senate,
a "deal" was struck: After his confirmation, the statute would be
19 See id. at 350-54, 357-58 (footnotes omitted).
20 See infra note 21.
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amended to prohibit the appointment of persons related to a sitting
judge on a particular court to the same court. The statute now reads:
No person shall be appointed to or employed in any office or duty
in any court who is related by affinity or consanguinity within the
degree of first cousin to any justice or judge of such court.2 1
Whether under appropriate challenge the statute would be found un-
constitutional is an interesting question. The only point I make is that
the premise behind Stras and Scott's following statement is incorrect:
Democrats and Republicans reportedly struck a deal: Judge
Betty Fletcher would assume senior status if William Fletcher won
confirmation. The agreement apparently held up, and the Senate
confirmed Judge William Fletcher on October 8, 1998. Yet the legal
theory behind the compromise seems nonsensical if Judge Betty
Fletcher "retain [ed]" her original office on the Ninth Circuit. Con-
gress's action suggests that, in the eyes of some of its members, se-
nior judges were no longer "members" of the court to which they
were appointed. Otherwise, the Senate would have squarely vio-
lated the antinepotism statute by confirmingJudge William Fletcher
when his mother, Judge Betty Fletcher, remained on the court in
senior status.2
2
21 28 U.S.C. § 458(a)(1).22 Stras & Scott, supra note 1, at 470 (footnotes omitted).
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